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Lawyers err every day, in hard and easy cases, in trials and
transactions, and in large and small firms. By turns commonplace and
noteworthy, the errors fall in both the private shadow and the public
light of for-profit, nonprofit, and government practice. The literature of
lawyer and, by extension, law firm error spans common law doctrines,'
state ethics rules and opinions,2 federal rules,3 practitioner treatises,4
restatements, 5 and academic casebooks 6 and commentaries. 7 Despite the
breadth of this literature, the intertwined problems of lawyer or law firm
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also wish to thank Jose Becerra, Daniel Butler, Jennifer Lefebvre, Leslie Pollack, Eryca Schiffman,
Stephanie Silk, Nickholas Harrell, and the University of Miami School of Law librarians for their
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1. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
2. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 1 l(b), 60(a)-(b).
4. See, e.g., Lawyer's Interests Adverse to Client, 20 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 401, 411-13 (Apr. 21, 2004) (discussing lawyer's interest adverse to client); see also
I RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 8 (2012).
5. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 48-52 (2000).
6. See generally, e.g., SUSAN SAAB FORTNEY & VINCENT R. JOHNSON, LEGAL
MALPRACTICE LAW: PROBLEMS AND PREVENTION (2008).
7. See, e.g., 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 7.3 n.2 (3d ed.
2013); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 5.6 (1986).
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error and client malpractice disclosure remain unresolved 8 and
surprisingly underappreciated. 9
Against the backdrop of widening debates over the ethical culture
and infrastructure of law firms, 10 this Article recasts the originating
problem of lawyer and law firm error narrowly in terms of client
malpractice disclosure.11 Framing the problem of professional error in
the limited terms of client disclosure focuses the inquiry more closely on
lawyer and law firm acts of delay in communicating information to
clients and acts of declination in withholding information from clients. 
12
Thus tailored, two questions stand out. First, when may a lawyer or law
firm permissibly delay disclosure of information to a client about an
error-related incident of malpractice? And second, when may a lawyer
or law firm permissibly withhold information from a client about such an
incident and its consequences? Like the instant Symposium, the
Conference on the Ethical Infrastructure and Culture of Law Firms,
both questions implicate considerations of law firm culture13 and
8. See Benjamin P. Cooper, Attorney Self-Disclosure, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 697, 713, 717-20
(2010); Benjamin P. Cooper, The Lawyer's Duty to Inform His Client of His Own Malpractice, 61
BAYLOR L. REV. 174, 180-87, 192-203 (2009); Vincent R. Johnson, Legal Malpractice Litigation
and the Duty to Report Misconduct, 1 ST. MARY'S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 40, 52-54
(2011); Frances Patricia Solari, Malpractice and Ethical Considerations, 19 N.C. CENT. L.J. 165,
174-75 (1991); Eli Wald, Taking Attorney-Client Communications (and Therefore Clients)
Seriously, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 747, 789-90 (2008) [hereinafter Wald, Attorney-Client
Communications].
9. See John S. Dzienkowski, Ethical Decisionmaking and the Design of Rules of Ethics, 42
HOFSTRA L. REV. 55, 80-82 (2013) (discussing individual and institutional accountability in law
practice); Susan Saab Fortney, Law as a Profession: Examining the Role of Accountability, 40
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 177, 209 (2012).
10. See RICHARD L. ABEL, LAWYERS IN THE DOCK: LEARNING FROM ATTORNEY
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS 198-205 (2008) (analyzing attorney misconduct); Elizabeth
Chambliss, Whose Ethics? The Benchmark Problem in Legal Ethics Research, in LAWYERS IN
PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 47, 47-58 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather
eds., 2012); see also Anthony V. Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics and the Rise ofRisk Management,
94 GEO. L.J. 1909, 1913 (2006); Leslie C. Levin, BadApples, BadLawyers or Bad Decisionmaking:
Lessons from Psychology andfrom Lawyers in the Dock, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1549, 1573-90
(2009) (book review).
11. See infra Part II.
12. This focus distinguishes acts of delay and declination from acts of dishonesty and fraud,
though both sets of acts entail elements of deliberation and intent. For discussions of lawyer
deception in counseling and negotiation, see Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV.
659, 686-87 (1990); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Lying to Clients for Economic Gain or Paternalistic
Judgment: A Proposal for a Golden Rule of Candor, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 774-76 (1990); see
generally James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation,
1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 926 (analyzing Model Rules 4.1-.3).
13. See Elizabeth Chambliss, Measuring Law Firm Culture, in 52 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS,
AND SOCIETY 1, 20-21 (Austin Sarat ed., 2010); Milton C. Regan Jr., Nested Ethics: A Tale of Two
Cultures, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 143, 144-48 (2013); Ted Schneyer, The Case for Proactive
Management-Based Regulation to Improve Professional Self-Regulation for U.S. Lawyers, 42
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infrastructure, 4 ethical regulation, 15 professional liability, 6 and risk
management policy' 7 and procedure.18
To address these fundamental, yet often overlooked questions, this
Article proceeds in three additional Parts. Part II situates the problems of
law firm error and client malpractice disclosure in the broader
framework of lawyer regulation and law firm ethical culture.' 9 Part III
summarizes the general law and rule framework governing law firm
malpractice disclosure, and illustrates the interplay of common law and
rule-based claims and defenses in malpractice disputes.20 Part IV
examines the content of contemporary best practice guidelines for
malpractice disclosure in the field of lawyer and law firm regulation.2'
More instrumental than aspirational or normative, the guidelines draw
substance from the professional liability insurance mandates of loss
prevention and risk management.
Taken together, these Parts construct a conventional, generalizable
account of law firm malpractice disclosure disputes familiar to
practitioners, regulators, and academics alike. Chronicled through a
series of interwoven case Illustrations, the account depicts the standard
HOFSTRA L. REV. 233, 248-49 (2013).
14. See Douglas R. Richmond, Law Firm Management and Professional Responsibility, 9
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 187, 199 (2003).
15. See Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, The Relational Infrastructure of Law Firm Culture and
Regulation: The Exaggerated Death of Big Law, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 109, 139-40 (2013); see also
Ronald D. Rotunda, Applying the Revised ABA Model Rules in the Age of the Internet: The Problem
of Metadata, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 175, 192-202 (2013) (discussing the treatment of inadvertently
disclosed computer documents).
16. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Big Law and Risk Management: Case Studies of Litigation,
Deals, and Diversity, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 991, 1005 (2011); Diane L. Karpman, Risk
Management: Beware of the Inadvertent Smoking Gun, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2008, at 57, 57-58.
17. See Susan Saab Fortney, Am I My Partner's Keeper? Peer Review in Law Firms, 66 U.
COLO. L. REV. 329, 345 (1995); Susan Saab Fortney, Law Firm Risk Management and Peer Review,
51 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 98, 99 (1997); William H. Fortune & Dulaney O'Roark, Risk
Management for Lawyers, 45 S.C. L. REV. 617, 631 (1994); William H. Simon, Where Is the
"Quality Movement" in Law Practice?, 2012 WIs. L. REV. 387, 405.
18. See Christine Parker et al., Regulating Law Firm Ethics Management: An Empirical
Assessment of an Innovation in Regulation of the Legal Profession in New South Wales, 37 J.L. &
Soc'Y 466, 471 (2010); Ronald D. Rotunda, Why Lawyers Are Different and Why We Are the Same:
Creating Structural Incentives in Large Law Firms to Promote Ethical Behavior-In-House Ethics
Counsel, Bill Padding, and In-House Ethics Training, 44 AKRON L. REV. 679, 709 (2011); Ted
Schneyer, On Further Reflection: How "Professional Self-Regulation" Should Promote
Compliance with Broad Ethical Duties of Law Firm Management, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 577, 604
(2011).
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part IlI.
21. See infra Part IV; see also, e.g., CNA PROF'L COUNSEL, TO ERR Is HUMAN: MANAGING
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progression of malpractice disclosure disputes from the formation of the
client-lawyer relationship (Illustration A); 2 2 to the lawyer's commission
and the law firm's discovery of a harmful performance error (Illustration
B);23 to the law firm's delay and omission in communicating information
of the error to the client (Illustration C);2 4 to the undisclosed sharing of
client information with the law firm's in-house general counsel,
malpractice insurance carrier, and outside professional liability counsel
(Illustration D);2 5 and finally, to the law firm's internal investigation of
client-lawyer conflicts of interest and the ultimate decision to withdraw
from the representation (Illustration E).26
II. THE LAWS AND RULES OF MALPRACTICE DISCLOSURE
The laws and rules of lawyer and law firm malpractice disclosure
stem from the law of agency and its principal fiduciary duties, 27 the law
of contract, 28 the law of professional negligence and intentional tort,
2 9
and the rules of professional conduct promulgated by the American Bar
Association ("ABA"), state bar associations, and federal and state
courts. 30 The predicate for the application of these duties and obligations
22. See infra Part II.A.1.
23. See infra Part II.B.1.
24. See infra Part I.C.1.
25. See infra Part II.D. 1.
26. See infra Part II.E. 1.
27. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.01, 8.08-.11 (2006); Eli Wald, Loyalty in
Limbo: The Peculiar Case of Attorneys' Loyalty to Clients, 40 ST. MARY'S L.J. 909, 924-25 (2009)
[hereinafter Wald, Loyalty in Limbo]; Charles W. Wolfram, A Cautionary Tale: Fiduciary Breach
as Legal Malpractice, 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 689, 704 (2006) (analyzing fiduciary breach as an
alternative remedy to lawyer misconduct).
28. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 18 (2000).
29. See id. §§ 48-52.
30. For the ABA and the majority of states, the Model Rules serve as "rules of reason." See
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (2012). Cast in the imperative terms, "shall" or "shall
not," the text of the Rules is "authoritative," defining "proper conduct for purposes of professional
discipline." Id. scope ("Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a Rule is a
basis for invoking the disciplinary process."). Alternatively cast in the discretionary term, "may,"
the text of the Rules is "permissive," defining areas of lawyer "professional judgment." Id. ("No
disciplinary action should be taken when the lawyer chooses not to act or acts within the bounds of
such discretion."). The Comments accompanying the Rules serve as "guides to interpretation" and
"compliance," explaining and illustrating their "meaning and purpose" without adding further
obligations. Id. By design, the Rules "provide a framework for the ethical practice of law"
predicated on "a larger legal context" of court rules and statutes, fiduciary laws of obligation, and
substantive and procedural law. Id. Because the Rules "are not designed to be a basis for civil
liability," a Rule violation "should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer nor
should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has been breached." Id. Moreover,
"violation of a Rule does not necessarily warrant any other nondisciplinary remedy, such as
disqualification of a lawyer in pending litigation." Id. At the same time, the ABA makes plain that
the Rules "do not... exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer." Id.
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is the formation of a client-lawyer relationship and its specified scope
of representation. In many cases, the formation and scope of
representation are the start and end points for evaluating malpractice
disclosure disputes.
A. Fiduciary Duties and the Formation of
the Client-Lawyer Relationship
Typically, the formation and scope of the client-lawyer relationship
are determined by state common law principles 31  and rules of
professional conduct.32 Under the common law of agency, all who assent
Indeed, "the Rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers," and as a consequence, "a lawyer's
violation of a Rule may be evidence of a breach of the applicable standard of conduct." Id.; see also
RESTATEMENT (THitRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52(2) cmt. f (2000).
31. In addition to the law of agency, equitable principles of estoppel may give rise to an
implied client-lawyer relationship, for example, in circumstances of detrimental reliance where a
client's subjective state of mind may have been reasonably induced by a lawyer. See MALLEN &
SMrrH, supra note 4, § 8.2. To the extent that a client may be defined constructively as a constituent
member of one or more corporate entities represented by a law firm, an attorney-client relationship
may be implied under entity-constituent theory. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility,
Formal Op. 92-365 (1992). An implied duty derives from fiduciary obligations of care and
protection, including anticipating reasonably foreseeable risks of harm to a client. Id. In many
malpractice disclosure cases, the risk of harm to a client may be reasonably apparent to a lawyer or
law firm, triggering the obligation to alert the client to any purported limitations on the scope of
legal representation, and, similarly, to apprise the client of the possible need for, and importance of,
representation by independent counsel. The phrase, "reasonably should know," when, as here, used
in reference to individual lawyers, "denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence
would ascertain the matter in question." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.0 (2012) ("A
person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances."). Often, the evidentiary record in
malpractice disclosure disputes shows no such cautionary communications by the lawyer or law
firm, no implied, express, or otherwise apparent limitations on the scope of legal representation, no
declination or termination of the relationship, and no referral for alternate, independent
representation.
32. The Model Rules explain that the purpose of the relationship may depend on relevant
circumstances and may pose a question of fact. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (2012).
The long-standing test for determining the formation of a client-lawyer relationship, here in Florida
and in states elsewhere, rests on a subjective measure of a client's belief that he is consulting a
lawyer in a professional capacity and on evidence of his manifested intention to seek professional
legal advice. See Fla. Bar v. Beach, 675 So. 2d 106, 109 (Fla. 1996) (stating that the client's
subjective belief in formation must be reasonable); see also Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372
F.3d 1250, 1281-82 (1 1th Cir. 2004) (adopting .'subjective but reasonable belief test"); Dean v.
Dean, 607 So. 2d 494, 497 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (approving "common law focus on subjective
considerations"). Under the Model Rules, the term belief or believes "denotes that the person
involved actually supposed the fact in question to be true." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
1.0(a) (2012) ("A person's belief may be inferred from circumstances."). Courts examine the facts
and circumstances of formation from the perspective of the client. See Broin v. Phillip Morris Cos.,
84 So. 3d 1107, 1110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); see also United States v. Abbell, 900 F. Supp. 449,
452 (S.D. Fla. 1995); In re Lentek Int'l, Inc., 377 B.R. 396, 399-401 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007), aff'd,
346 F. App'x. 430, 433 (1 1th Cir. 2009). Circumstances evincing a reasonable, factual basis for
reliance are sufficient to establish valid grounds for formation, as noted in the Restatement:
20131
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to act on behalf of another person, and voluntarily stand subject to that
person's control, constitute common law agents.33 Lawyers, as common
law agents, are subject to the general fiduciary principle governing the
agency relationship.34 This principle dictates that an agent's fiduciary
obligation is owed to the principal, defined as an individual or an
organizational entity.35 That fiduciary obligation may extend beyond the
termination of the agency relationship.3 6 Post-termination duties may
apply to the agent's use of confidential information provided by the
principal or acquired through the agency relationship.37 Those duties
"may prohibit the agent's communication to third parties of information
that the principal has confidentially provided to the agent.,
38
Because the relationship between a principal and an agent is a
fiduciary one in which an agent assents to act subject to the principal's
control and on the principal's behalf, numerous states employ a general
fiduciary principle that requires the agent to "subordinate the agent's
interests to those of the principal and place the principal's interests first
as to matters connected with the agency relationship. 39 Predicated on
the designation of the agent as a fiduciary, this overarching principle
imposes a duty "to act loyally for the principal's benefit. 40 Implied at
common law, the duty of loyalty "supplements manifestations that a
principal makes to an agent," for example, in an engagement letter or a
retainer agreement, "making it unnecessary for the principal to graft
explicit qualifications and prohibitions onto the principal's statements of
authorization to the agent.",4' In this respect, the general fiduciary
principle of agency "unifies the more specific rules of loyalty" created
A relationship of client and lawyer arises when: (1) a person manifests to a lawyer the
person's intent that the lawyer provide legal services for the person; and either (a) the
lawyer manifests to the person consent to do so; or (b) the lawyer fails to manifest lack
of consent to do so, and the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person
reasonably relies on the lawyer to provide the services ....
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 (2000).
33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. c (2006).
34. Id.; see Wolfram, supra note 27, at 705.
35. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmts. b-c (2006) ("When a principal is an
organizational entity, an agent has a fiduciary obligation to the entity.").
36. Id. § 8.01 cmt. c.
37. Id.
38. Id. ("An agent may be subject to duties of confidentiality to a principal that limit the
agent's duty to reveal information to third parties."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 61-67 (2000) (discussing lawyers' duties in handling and using
confidential client information).
39. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. b (2006).
40. Id. § 8.01 cmt. a.
41. Id. § 8.01 cmt. b; see also id. § 8.01 cmt. b, illus. 1, 3; id. § 8.07; RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14(1)(b) (2000) (discussing implied formation of the client-
lawyer relationship).
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42
by statute, regulation, and contract. Rooted in standards of good faith 43
and best interest,44 these rules of loyalty protect against the "risk of self-
interested action" by an agent in attempting "to exploit gaps in the
principal's manifestations" for the benefit or enhancement of the agent.45
Formulated broadly, the fiduciary duty of loyalty serves the
prophylactic purpose of protecting the interests of the principal, for
example, interests in preserving confidential information.46 The duty of
loyalty prohibits direct and indirect efforts by an agent to use or to
disclose confidential information47 arising out of the agent's position.48
The same duty prohibits an agent's use of the principal's confidential
information without the consent of the principal. 49 Bound by this duty,
an agent may neither use nor communicate the confidential information
(for example, nonpublic financial statements) of the principal for the
agent's own purposes.50 Because an agent's duty of confidentiality
continues after the agency relationship terminates, it bars a former agent
from using confidential information, acquired during the agent's
employment with the principal, to later disadvantage or harm the
principal.5 1 From a fiduciary standpoint, an agent plainly is in no
position "disinterestedly to assess" whether harm to the principal
reasonably attributable to the use of confidential information may occur
as a result of the agent's actions.
52
Fiduciary norms lay the foundation for ethics rules governing the
scope and objectives of client representation.53 From the outset of the
client-lawyer relationship, a lawyer is obliged to "abide by a client's
42. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. b (2006); see also id. § 8.02 crnts. d-e; id
§ 8.04 cmt. b.
43. Standards of good faith derive, in part, from the duty of good conduct. See id. § 8.10 ("An
agent has a duty, within the scope of the agency relationship, to act reasonably and to refrain from
conduct that is likely to damage the principal's enterprise."); Airgas, Inc. v. Cravath, Swaine &
Moore LLP, No. 10-612, 2010 WL 3046586, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3,2010).
44. See Schock v. Nash, 732 A.2d 217, 225-26 (Del. 1999) (observing that "[a]n attorney-in-
fact, under the duty of loyalty, always has the obligation to act in the best interest of the principal
unless the principal voluntarily consents to the attorney-in-fact engaging in an interested transaction
after full disclosure").
45. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. b (2006).
46. See id. §§ 8.02 cmt. b, 8.03 cmt. b, 8.04 cmt. a, 8.05 cmt. c.
47. See id. §§ 8.04 cmt. c, 8.05 cmt. c ("A former agent remains subject to duties concerning
confidential information and property of the principal.").
48. See id. § 8.02 cmt. c.
49. See id. § 8.02 cmt. d.
50. See id. § 8.05; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 59 (2000).
51. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05 reporter's n. c (2006).
52. In general, the principal, rather than the agent, is in the best position to assess the potential
adverse impact of the agent's use of such confidential information on the principal's interests. See
id. § 8.04 cmt. b.
53. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2012).
2013]
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decisions concerning the objectives of representation" and to consult
reasonably with the client as to the means of their implementation. 4 The
Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules" or "Rules")
explicitly confer upon a client the ultimate authority to determine the
purposes to be served by legal representation, and the right to consult
with a lawyer about the means (for example, advocacy, counseling, or
negotiation) to be used in achieving appropriate litigation or
transactional objectives.55 Absent termination of the relationship, the
Rules direct a lawyer to "carry through to conclusion all matters
undertaken for a client., 56 When "a lawyer has served a client over a
substantial period in a variety of matters," the Model Rules note that
"the client sometimes may assume that the lawyer will continue to serve
on a continuing basis unless the lawyer gives notice of withdrawal. 57
The Rules also dictate, for reasons of client detrimental reliance, that any
"[d]oubt about whether a client-lawyer relationship still exists" on a
continuing basis "should be clarified by the lawyer, preferably in
writing, so that the client will not mistakenly suppose the lawyer
is looking after the client's affairs when the lawyer has ceased to do
so. ' 58 Consider the formation and scope of the client-lawyer relationship
in the following Illustration of the initial stage of a malpractice
disclosure dispute.
1. Illustration A
An international generic drug manufacturer with ownership
interests in numerous subsidiary and affiliated entities governed by
partially overlapping boards, directors, and officers, and involved across
a spectrum of litigated and non-litigated matters, 59 engages the corporate
54. Id. R. 1.2(a). Debates over the specific means of representation may occur in both trial
and appellate contexts. See David H. Tennant & Lauren M. Michals, Mixing Business with Ethics:
The Duty to Report Malpractice by Trial Counsel, 20 PROF. LAW., no. 1, 2010, at 3, 5-6.
55. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 1 (2012). The Rules permit lawyers and
clients to place limitations on the objectives and scope of representation, provided such limitations
are reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent. Id R. 1.2(c). The
Comments accompanying the Model Rules highlight the fact that "an agreement for a limited
representation does not exempt a lawyer from the duty to provide competent representation," hence
"all agreements concerning a lawyer's representation of a client must accord with the Rules of
Professional Conduct," as well as obligations and duties under other law (for example, decisional,
constitutional, and statutory laws). Id. R. 1.2 cmts. 7-8.
56. Id. R. 1.3 cmt. 4.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. For this Illustration, assume that neither the law firm's engagement letter nor subsequent
correspondence, including billing records, between the firm and the client clearly and consistently
distinguish among the relevant parent, subsidiary, and affiliated entities.
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and intellectual property groups of a multinational law firm60 to advise
it in obtaining U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") approval to
market a generic version of a patented brand name drug product prior to
expiration of the patent, and also to assist it in acquiring a domestic
generic drug manufacturer owned by another pharmaceutical
corporation, in order to expand the U.S. market for its new generic and
brand name products. 6' Prior and, in some instances, ongoing
engagements of the law firm by the client involve its parent, subsidiary,
and affiliated entities.
2. Formation Disputes
The resolution of formation and scope disputes under Illustration A
centers on whether the client entity formed a client-lawyer relationship
with the law firm, and, moreover, operated on the well-grounded belief
that it was consulting the firm's corporate and intellectual property
groups in their capacity as legal advisors with the intention of seeking
professional legal advice within the scope of the corporate and
intellectual property transactions at issue. The reasonableness of the
client's subjective belief, both from its perspective and from any
objective agency perspective, is crucial to this inquiry. Evidence bearing
on that belief may include a prior engagement letter or the payment
of fees to the firm.62 If proven to be well founded, the client's belief
60. For this Illustration, assume that the intellectual property group, like intellectual property
groups at many modem large law firms, includes a healthcare team that serves the pharmaceutical
industry in the United States and international markets. On the ethics of modem large firm practice,
see generally Bruce A. Green, Foreword: Professional Challenges in Large Firm Practices, 33
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 7 (2005); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Corporate Norms and Contemporary Law Firm
Practice, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 931 (2002); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Foreword: Professional
Responsibility and the Corporate Lawyer, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 197 (2000); Robert K. Vischer,
Big Law and the Marginalization of Trust, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 165 (2012).
61. For this Illustration, assume that the healthcare team, comprised chiefly of intellectual
property litigators and patent attorneys, specialized in FDA regulatory compliance and FDA-related
intellectual property matters, especially litigation under the federal Hatch-Waxman Act. On the
history of the Hatch-Waxman Act (that is, the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act) and its impact on the manufacture and regulation of generic drugs by the pharmaceutical
industry, see generally Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006), and 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)
(1994)); Daiichi Pharm. Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 2d 672 (D.N.J. 2006), rev'd sub nom.,
Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254 (2007); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Geneva
Pharm., Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d 576 (E.D. Pa. 2002); Phillip B.C. Jones, Navigating the Hatch-
Waxman Act's Safe Harbor, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 475 (2002); David C. McPhie, Old Drugs, New
Uses: Solving a Hatch-Waxman Patent Predicament, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 155 (2004); Elizabeth
Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch- Waxman Act: History, Structure, and Legacy,
71 ANTITRUST L.J. 585 (2003).
62. In the context of this Illustration, even if an agreement stipulating reasonable limitations
had been reached, the firm owed the client all the ethical obligations and duties of care, competence,
2013]
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may oblige the firm to carry through to conclusion all corporate
and intellectual property matters undertaken unless or until the firm
formally withdraws.63
To be sure, a law firm may challenge the contention that its lawyers
knew or should have known that their actions during the period in
controversy would induce the client reasonably to believe, and
detrimentally rely on the belief, that it had entered into a client-lawyer
relationship. In fact, a firm may question whether a client's detrimental
reliance and risk of harm were reasonably foreseeable and were
sufficient to give rise to the firm's obligation to promptly alert the client
of any implied or express limitations in the scope of legal representation,
or to apprise the client of the possible need for, and importance of,
representation by independent counsel. Presuming evidence of timely
cautionary communications by the firm, timely termination of the client-
lawyer relationship, and timely referral for alternate representation by
independent counsel, a firm may be able to maintain that the client
understood or reasonably should have understood that limited entity
services would be rendered.
Often in the corporate family context of Illustration A, the client's
understanding of the nature of the representation at stake may evolve
over time as the retention expands from a single entity into multiple
subsidiary and affiliated entities.64 In situations of this kind, a law firm,
in an effort to anticipate conflict of interest charges related to
incompletely documented situations of concurrent representation, may
concede that multiple entity clients effectively formed a client-lawyer
relationship with the firm as a single, unified group. To this point,
commentators remark that large modern law firms increasingly "have
tried to encourage clients to see themselves as clients of the firm rather
and communication with respect to the intellectual property evaluation and the corporate transaction
negotiation.
63. Doubt surrounding the formation of the attorney-client relationship should be promptly
clarified or eliminated by a law firm, preferably in writing. In such circumstances, under Model
Rule 1.16, a "lawyer has the option to withdraw if it can be accomplished without material adverse
effect on the client's interests." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 cmt. 7 (2012). Upon
actual termination of representation, pursuant to subdivision (d) of the Rule, a lawyer must "take
steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interest," and to mitigate adverse
consequences to the client, "such as giving reasonable notice to the client and allowing time for
employment of other counsel." Id. R. 1.16(d). Where, as here, a "future dispute about the
withdrawal may be anticipated, it may be advisable to prepare a written statement reciting the
circumstances." Id. R. 1.16 cmt. 4.
64. For this reason, the engagement letter and subsequent correspondence, including billing
records, between a law firm and a client should be careful to distinguish among affiliated client
entities.
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than clients of any particular lawyer."65 Next, consider the duties of care,
competence, and diligence.
B. Care, Competence, and Diligence
The client-lawyer relationship gives rise to lawyer fiduciary duties
of care, competence, and diligence.66 The duties encompass individual
lawyers and law firms as a whole. Both ABA 67 and American Law
Institute ("ALI")68 ethical guidelines are in accord with these elemental
duties. To carry out those guidelines, courts require lawyers and law
firms to meet minimum thresholds of legal knowledge, investigative care
and effort, and skill.69 The Model Rules also require lawyer and law firm
care and competence.7° Under the Rules, an individual lawyer must
provide competent representation to a client. 71 The requirements of
competent representation similarly include "the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation., 72 The accompanying Comments link thorough and
adequate preparation of a particular matter to "inquiry into and analysis
of the factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods and
procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners. 73
65. THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 141 (2010); see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 31 cmt. f (2000) ("When a client
retains a lawyer who practices with a firm, the presumption is that both the lawyer and the firm have
been retained."). On the content of law firm organizational culture, see Susan Saab Fortney, Are
Law Firm Partners Islands unto Themselves? An Empirical Study of Law Firm Peer Review and
Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 308-09 (1996); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Moral Intuitions and
Organizational Culture, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 941, 985 (2007).
66. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (2012) ("In all professional functions a
lawyer should be competent, prompt and diligent.").
67. See id. R. 1.1, 1.3.
68. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 cmts. d-e (2000);
id. §§ 49, 50, 52; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.08 cmts. c-d, 8.11 cmt. b (2006).
69. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Lecznar, 690 So. 2d 1284, 1285-88 (Fla. 1997); Fla. Bar v.
Sandstrom, 609 So. 2d 583, 584 (Fla. 1992) (per curiam); McAbee v. Edwards, 340 So. 2d 1167,
1169-70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
70. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2012).
71. Id.
72. Id. The Comments to Rule 1.1 explain that the "relevant factors" to "determin[e] whether
a lawyer employs the requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter," as in the Illustrations
here:
[I]nclude the relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer's
general experience, the lawyer's training and experience in the field in question, the
preparation and study the lawyer is able to give the matter, and whether it is feasible to
refer the matter to, or associate or consult with, a lawyer of established competence in
the field in question.
Id. R. 1.1 cmt. 1.
73. Id. R. 1.1 cmt. 5.
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Requisite levels of "attention and preparation are determined in part by
what is at stake"-complex corporate and intellectual property
transactions of the sort at issue in Illustration A "ordinarily require more
extensive treatment.,
74
Courts and ethics rules enlarge the mandate of lawyer care and
competence to encompass law firms and their organizational structures
of supervision. 75 The Model Rules regulate the responsibilities of
partners, managers, and supervisory lawyers, commanding firm-wide,
institutional adherence to accepted standards of professional conduct.76
Under this command, law firm partners and other lawyers possessing
comparable firm managerial authority must "make reasonable efforts to
ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance
that all lawyers" properly conform to applicable ethics rules.
77
Bolstering this command, the Comments direct "lawyers with
managerial authority within a firm to make reasonable efforts to
establish internal policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable
assurance" of such firm-wide conformity, particularly policies and
procedures "designed to detect and resolve conflicts of interest," and,
equally imperative, to "ensure that inexperienced lawyers are properly
supervised., 78 The Rules assign institutional responsibility for another
lawyer's ethical violation, not only if "the lawyer orders, or with
knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved," but
also if:
[T]he lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the
law firm in which the other lawyer practices or has direct supervisory
authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time
when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take
reasonable remedial action.
79
This organizational sense of managerial and supervisory diligence
is also expressed in terms of adequate preparation and performance.8°
74. Id.
75. See O'Keefe v. Darnell, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1361 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (discussing
evidentiary requirement of active involvement in misconduct); see also Young v. Becker &
Poliakoff, 88 So. 3d 1002, 1009 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
76. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (2012); see Douglas R. Richmond, Law
Firm Partners as Their Brothers' Keepers, 96 KY. L.J. 231, 236-38 (2007-2008).
77. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDUcT R. 5.1(a) (2012).
78. Id. R. 5.1 cmt. 2.
79. Id. R. 5.1(c)(1)-(2). Appropriate remedial action by a partner or managing lawyer,
according to the Comments, "would depend on the immediacy of that lawyer's involvement and the
seriousness of the misconduct." Id. R. 5.1 cmt. 5.
80. See Fla. Bar v. Barcus, 697 So. 2d 71, 73-74 (Fla. 1997); Fla. Bar v. Kinney, 606 So. 2d
367, 368 (Fla. 1992) (per curiam).
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The Model Rules declare that "[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a client."'" Comments to the
Rules emphasize that "[a] lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a
client despite... personal inconvenience to the lawyer and take
whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's
cause or endeavor., 82 In this sense, the lawyer serving as agent must "act
with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with
zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf. ' 83 Consider care, competence,
and diligence in the following Illustration of the error and discovery
stage of a malpractice disclosure dispute.
1. Illustration B
For Illustration B, consider the same facts as in Illustration A,
except that the law firm's intellectual property group, in advising the
client whether the generic version of the drug product, when marketed,
would constitute an act of patent infringement under the Hatch-Waxman
Act,84 assigns a healthcare team partner with limited experience in FDA-
related regulatory affairs. After completing his due diligence search, the
partner concludes, albeit with certain reservations, that the generic drug
would not infringe on the branded drug patent, and notifies the patent
holder of the client's plan to seek federal approval of its generic drug
application. Soon after, the firm advises the client to acquire the second
generic drug manufacturer to broaden the domestic and international
markets for its new and existing drug products. Subsequently, the firm
receives communications from the brand name drug maker, objecting to its
patent notice letter and threatening suit to enjoin the statutory approval
process. In response to the brand name drug maker's continuing
objections, the head of the intellectual property group, a senior
partner, reviews the healthcare team's due diligence documents and
concludes not only that the patent on the branded drug appears to be
valid, but also that the generic drug seems to infringe on the patent.
2. Care, Competence, and Diligence Disputes
The resolution of care, competence, and diligence disputes under
Illustration B hinges on whether the law firm discharged its fiduciary
duties of legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation
81. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2012).
82. Id. R. 1.3 cmt. 1.
83. Id.
84. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006), and 35 U.S.C. § 271(E) (1994)).
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reasonably necessary for the representation.85 Here, the client may assert
that the firm neglected to conduct the necessary due diligence inquiry
into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the patent, and
neglected to use methods and procedures meeting the standards of
competent FDA and corporate practitioners. Moreover, it may claim that
the work of the firm lacked the requisite levels of attention and
preparation warranted by the magnitude of the transactions at stake, even
though complex transactions ordinarily require more extensive
treatment. The client may also contend that it was feasible to refer the
transactions to, or associate or consult with, other lawyers at the firm or
elsewhere of established competence in the field of FDA regulation and
corporate acquisitions.
More broadly, the client may argue that the firm breached its
institutional duties of care and competence by failing in its
responsibilities through the inaction of partners, managers, and
supervisory lawyers. It may find deficiencies in the firm's internal
policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that all
firm-affiliated lawyers fulfilled their fiduciary duties and conformed to
the Model Rules, particularly in ensuring the proper supervision of less
experienced lawyers.86 Equally significant, the client may allege that the
firm's lawyers with managerial authority or with direct supervisory
authority over the matter, as well as other lawyers advising the
transactions, knew or reasonably should have known of the lack of care,
competence, and diligence at a time when damaging consequences could
have been avoided or mitigated.
To counter these claims, the law firm in this Illustration may seek
to show that its lawyers gave their continuing attention to the needs of
the representation precisely in order to assure that there was no neglect
of the client's rights and interests. Likewise, the firm may endeavor to
show that its lawyers in no way engaged in intentional efforts to
prejudice the client's interests or to disadvantage the client during the
course of the relationship. Accordingly, the firm may work to adduce
evidence that its lawyers labored to vindicate the client's cause in the
transactions and advanced its best interests throughout the representation
85. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1, 1.3-.4 (2012).
86. For this Illustration, assume that the partners, managers, and supervisory lawyers
approved the specific transactional conduct in controversy or, with knowledge thereof, ratified the
conduct involved.
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in compliance with the firm's fiduciary duties.87 Next, consider candor,
communication, and consultation.
C. Candor, Communication, and Consultation
The client-lawyer relationship also generates lawyer duties of
candor 8 8 communication, and consultation. 89 These fiduciary duties
demand prompt communication and full and fair material disclosure. 90
Both ABA 91 and AL192 ethical guidelines buttress such disclosure
principles. Court and ethics rules, and associated state bar opinions,
mandate lawyer candor,93 as well as fair and honest dealing.94 Under the
87. In this Illustration, if firm partners knew or reasonably should have known of any lack of
care, competence, and diligence at a time when damaging consequences to the client could have
been avoided or mitigated, yet declined to take reasonable remedial action, their compliance defense
will likely falter.
88. See Peter J. Henning, Lawyers, Truth, and Honesty in Representing Clients, 20 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 209, 239-43 (2006); Vincent R. Johnson, "Absolute and Perfect
Candor" to Clients, 34 ST. MARY'S L.J. 737, 770-73 (2003).
89. See Gary A. Munneke & Theresa E. Loscalzo, The Lawyer's Duty to Keep Clients
Informed: Establishing a Standard of Care in Professional Liability Actions, 9 PACE L. REV. 391,
426-27 (1989); see also Kimberlee K. Kovach, The Duty to Disclose Litigation Risks and
Opportunities for Settlement: The Essence of Informed Decision-Making, 33 U. LA VERNE L. REV.
71, 93-94 (2011); Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the
Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41, 67-69 (1979).
90. See Herbin v. Hoeffel, 806 A.2d 186, 197 (D.C. Cir. 2002); FDIC v. Martin, 801 F. Supp.
617, 620 (M.D. Fla. 1992); David Welch Co. v. Erskine & Tulley, 250 Cal. Rptr. 339, 341 & n.2
(Ct. App. 1988); Fla. Bar v. Nowacki, 697 So. 2d 828, 830, 832 (Fla. 1997); Gerlach v. Donnelly,
98 So. 2d 493, 498 (Fla. 1957); Smyrna Developers, Inc. v. Bornstein, 177 So. 2d 16, 18 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1965); see also Resolution Trust Corp. v. H-, P.C., 128 F.R.D. 647, 648-49 (N.D. Tex.
1989) ("The relationship between a client and an attorney has been held by Texas courts to be one
of '[t]he most abundant good faith; absolute and perfect candor or openness and honesty; the
absence of any concealment or deception, however slight."'); Iowa Supreme Court Att'y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Gottschalk, 729 N.W.2d 812, 820 (Iowa 2007) ("Attorneys are in a fiduciary
relationship with their clients requiring open and honest communication to ensure effective
representation.").
91. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmts. 1-4 (2012); ABA Comm. on Ethics
& Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-453 (2008) (opining on the ethical implications of in-house
ethics consultation); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 02-425 (2002)
(describing the duty to explain the law and the benefits and risks of alternate courses of action).
92. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.11 cmt. b (describing the duty to provide
information) (2006); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20 cmt. c (2000)
(describing the duty to inform and consult with a client).
93. For a survey of relevant ABA and state bar opinions, see ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof 1
Responsibility, Informal Op. 1010 (1967) (stating that a lawyer who failed to present his personal
injury client's claim to the state's "Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund" was required to provide
a "full disclosure" to his client); see also Colo. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 113 (2005),
available a! http://www.cobar.org/repository/Ethics/FormalEthicsOpion/FormalEthicsOpinion_
113_2011 .pdf ("[A] lawyer has an ethical duty to make prompt and specific disclosure to a client of
the lawyer's error if the error is material, meaning that it will likely result in prejudice to a client's
right or claim."); Minn. Lawyers Prof l Responsibility, Op. 21 (2009), available at
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Model Rules, a lawyer must "exercise independent professional
judgment and render candid advice" in representing a client. 95 The
Comments accompanying the Rule stress that "[a] client is entitled to
straightforward advice expressing the lawyer's honest assessment.,
96
Candor involves effective communication informing the client of
the status of representation and adequately explaining matters
appropriate to the circumstances.97 A lawyer in litigation and
nonlitigation situations, the Model Rules recommend, "should maintain
https://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/court-rules/rule.php?name=prlawy-21 (discussing a lawyer's
duty to act under the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct when the lawyer "knows that
lawyer's conduct could reasonably be the basis for a non-frivolous malpractice claim by a current
client that materially affects the client's interests"); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof l Ethics,
Op. 789 (2005), available at http://www.nysba.org/CustomTemplates/Content.aspx?id=5371.
Further, New York State Bar Ethics Opinion 734 states that:
Ordinarily, since lawyers have an obligation to keep their clients reasonably informed
about the matter and to provide information that their clients need to make decisions
relating to the representation, the [Legal Aid] Society's lawyer would have an obligation
to disclose to the client the possibility that they have made a significant error or
omission.
N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof I Ethics, Op. 734 (2000). New York State Bar Ethics Opinion
275 states:
[A] lawyer who fails to act where he has undertaken to do so, thereby causing his client's
claim to be barred by limitations, has a professional duty promptly to notify his client of
his failure to act and of the possible claim that the client may thus have against him for
damages.
N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 275 (1972).
94. See Fla. Bar v. Vamer, 780 So. 2d 1, 5-6 (Fla. 2001) (per curiam); Fla. Bar v. Williams,
753 So. 2d 1258, 1261-62 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam); Fla. Bar v. Robinson, 654 So. 2d 554, 555 (Fla.
1995) (per curiam); Fla. Bar v. Gaskin, 403 So. 2d 425, 426 (Fla. 1981) (per curiam); see also
Hendrickson v. Sears, 310 N.E.2d 131, 135 (Mass. 1974) ("The attorney owes his client a duty of
full and fair disclosure of facts material to the client's interests."); Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 621 A.2d
459, 464 (N.J. 1993) ("Inherent in the attorney-client relationship is the fiduciary duty to render full
and fair disclosure of all material facts to the client."); Palmer v. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, 359
N.Y.S.2d 128, 129-30 (App. Div. 1974) (per curiam) (finding two-year suspension appropriate
where, in addition to other misconduct, attorney "showed a complete lack of candor and honesty in
his dealings with his clients"); Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex. 1988) ("As a
fiduciary, an attorney is obligated to render a full and fair disclosure of facts material to the client's
representation.").
95. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2012).
96. Id. R. 2.1 cmt. 1.
97. See N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 789 (2005), available at
http://www.nysba.org/CustomTemplates/Content.aspx?id=5371 (reiterating that "the firm's duty is
to provide the affected client(s) with all the information material to the client's decision whether to
establish or continue the attorney-client relationship"); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4
& cmts. 1-4, 2.1, 4.1; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.11 cmt. b (2006) (describing the duty
to provide information); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20 cmt. c
(2000) (describing the duty to inform and consult with a client); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics &
Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-453 (2008) (recommending consultation and explanation of
possible unethical consequences of proposed action); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl
Responsibility, Formal Op. 02-425 (2002) (noting the duty to explain the law and the benefits and
risks of alternate courses of action).
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communication with a client concerning the representation. 98 Under the
Rules, a lawyer must "promptly inform the client of any decision or
circumstance with respect to which the client's informed consent ... is
required."99 The lawyer must also "reasonably consult with the client
about the means by which the client's objectives are to be
accomplished" and "keep the client reasonably informed about the status
of the matter," for instance, with respect to "significant developments
affecting the timing or the substance of the representation."' 00 The
lawyer as well must "promptly comply with reasonable requests for
information."10' Further, the lawyer must "explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation.'
10 2
The Comments to the Model Rules explain that "[r]easonable
communication between the lawyer and the client is necessary for the
client effectively to participate in the representation."' 1 3 Indeed, a "client
should have sufficient information to participate intelligently in
decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means
by which they are to be pursued."' 04 The principle animating the Rules
"is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client expectations for
information consistent with the duty to act in the client's best interests,
and the client's overall requirements as to the character of
representation."' 1 5 Consonant with these guidelines, a "lawyer may not
withhold information to serve the lawyer's own interest or convenience
or the interests or convenience of another person."'0 6
Candor also entails truthfulness in statements to others. 10 7 The
Model Rules mandate that a lawyer "shall not knowingly ... make a
false statement of material fact or law to a third person" in the course of
representing a client. 08 On the same logic, the Rules prohibit lawyer
98. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (2012).
99. Id. R. 1.4 (a).
100. Id. R. 1.4 (a)(2)-(3) & cmt. 3.
101. Id. R. 1.4 (a)(4).
102. Id. R. 1.4 (b).
103. Id R. 1.4 cmt. 1.
104. Id. R. 1.4 cmt. 5.
105. Id.
106. Id. R. 1.4 cmt. 7.
107. See id. R. 4.1 cmt. 1 ("A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing with others on a
client's behalf.").
108. Id. R. 4.1(a); see also Brown v. Cnty. of Genesee, 872 F.2d 169, 174 (6th Cir. 1989)
(requiring actual knowledge of fact in question); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Bolusky, 23 P.3d
268, 275-76 (Okla. 2001) (holding the Oklahoma equivalent to Model Rule 4.1(a) inapposite to
lawyer-client statements); In re Merkel, 138 P.3d 847, 853 (Or. 2006) (per curiam) (finding
information material if it "would or could significantly influence the hearer's decision-making
process").
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misrepresentation, for example, when "the lawyer incorporates or
affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer knows is false."
' 10 9
Additional misrepresentations can "occur by partially true but
misleading statements or omissions that are the equivalent of affirmative
false statements."' 10 Certain state ethics opinions acknowledge that the
exact timing and extent of a firm's malpractice disclosure obligations
may vary with the circumstances."' Thus, in New York,
notwithstanding contextual variation, a firm is duty bound "to provide
the affected client(s) with all the information material to the client's
decision whether to establish or continue the attorney-client
relationship." ' 12 For some, the lawyer duty of explanation inscribed by
the Model Rules" 3 "calls for a dialogue between lawyer and client"
more far reaching than ordinary counseling." 4  Consider candor,
communication, and consultation in the following Illustration of the
communication stage of a malpractice disclosure dispute.
1. Illustration C
For Illustration C, consider the same facts as in Illustrations A and
B, except that the head of the law firm's intellectual property group,
a senior partner motivated by dual regulatory compliance and
professional liability concerns, reports his conclusion regarding the
continuing validity of the branded drug patent and the generic drug
patent infringement to the firm's in-house general counsel. 115 Neither
109. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 1 (2012).
110. Id.
11. See, e.g., N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 789 (2005), available at
http://www.nysba.org/CustomTemplates/Content.aspx?id=5371 ("Nothing in this opinion is
intended to alter the lawyer's duty to advise a client of circumstances requiring a client to act.").
112. Id.
113. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b) (2012).
114. Thomas D. Morgan, "The Client(s) of a Corporate Lawyer," 33 CAP. U. L. REv. 17, 31
(2004); see Thomas D. Morgan, Toward Abandoning Organized Professionalism, 30 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 947, 971 (2002); see also Robert J. Condlin, "What's Love Got to Do with It?" -- "It's Not
Like They're Your Friends for Christ's Sake ": The Complicated Relationship Between Lawyer and
Client, 82 NEB. L. REV. 211, 306-308 (2003); Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, Rethinking Lawyer
Regulation. How a Relational Approach Would Improve Professional Rules and Roles, 2012 MICH.
ST. L. REv. 513, 534-35; Wald, Attorney-Client Communications, supra note 8, at 789-90.
115. On the role of in-house general counsel, see Susan Saab Fortney, Law Firm General
Counsel as Sherpa: Challenges Facing the In-Firm Lawyer's Lawyer, 53 U. KAN. L. REv. 835, 840-
41 (2005); Douglas R. Richmond, Essential Principles for Law Firm General Counsel, 53 U. KAN.
L. REv. 805, 813-14 (2005). The role of a law firm's in-house general counsel is to advise the firm
in the areas of professional responsibility and risk management, including conflicts, legal ethics,
loss prevention, and litigation. See Richmond, supra, at 813-14; see also Elizabeth Chambliss &
David B. Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics Advisors, General Counsel, and Other Compliance
Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 565-67 (2002); Elizabeth Chambliss &
David B. Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure in Large Law Firms: A Call for
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the senior partner nor the general counsel immediately informs the
client of this revised opinion or the firm's attendant risk of
malpractice liability arising from its earlier opinion.11 6 Instead, after
considerable delay, the partner advises the client that the
disputed patent appears, upon closer scrutiny, to be valid and
offers to continue the firm's representation of the client in this and
other matters.
1 7
2. Candor, Communication, and Consultation Disputes
Resolution of candor, communication, and consultation disputes
under Illustration C rests on whether the law firm breached its fiduciary
duties and violated the Model Rules by neglecting to render candid,
prompt, and effective advice. Here, the client may contend that the firm
declined to give it straightforward advice expressing an honest legal
assessment of its rights in negotiating and in potentially litigating the
transactions, including information on the status of the controverted
patent and the circumstances of the firm's possible negligence and
malpractice. The client may assert that the lack of reasonable
communication, complete information, and a thorough explanation of all
of the circumstances and considerations at hand deprived it of the ability
to participate effectively in the representation and to participate
intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation
and its aftermath. The client may point out that the firm had ample time
to explain the transactions, to review all important provisions of the
corporate and intellectual property documents with the client before,
during, and after the transactions consistent with the duty to act in the
client's best interests, and, if necessary, to refer the client to independent
counsel. Most important, the client may suggest that the firm withheld
information of its own negligence to serve its institutional interest and
convenience and knowingly misrepresented material facts by making
partially true but misleading statements and omissions to the client.
For its rejoinder, the law firm may deny that its lawyers
misrepresented their own negligence in advising and negotiating the
corporate and intellectual property transactions through either
deliberately misleading statements or calculated omissions. The firm
Research and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 691, 704-06 (2002).
116. On the elements of malpractice liability, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 48-54 (2000); FORTNEY & JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 35-100; see also
Wald, Attorney-Client Communications, supra note 8, at 792-97 (discussing lawyer disclosure of
malpractice liability coverage).
117. For this Illustration, assume that the firm declines to disclose its own possible negligence
and potential conflict of interest in proposing its continued representation of the client.
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may seek to show that it provided the client with reasonable
communication, complete information, and a thorough explanation of all
the relevant circumstances and considerations at stake in the
transactions, enabling the client to participate in the representation and
in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation. Moreover, it
may altogether disagree that applicable ethics rules require the firm to
inform the client of its right to sue the firm for malpractice. 1 8 Next,
consider confidentiality.
D. Confidentiality
The client-lawyer relationship imposes a duty of confidentiality
upon a lawyer." 9 Both ABA 20 and AL'12' ethical guidelines approve
this essential fiduciary principle. Courts have recognized that the
disclosure of confidential information obtained from a fiduciary
relationship may state a cause of action, 122 and, thus, have assigned
liability to lawyers for disclosure of confidential information from a
client. 23 Under the Model Rules, "in the absence of the client's
informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal information relating to the
representation," unless otherwise permitted or required by the Rules or
118. But see Fla. Bar v. Varner, 780 So. 2d 1, 5-6 (Fla. 2001) (per curiam) (stating that the
"decision to go forward with a deception rather than honestly admitting to his mistake [was] so
contrary to the most basic requirement of candor"); Fla. Bar v. Morse, 587 So. 2d 1120, 1120-21
(Fla. 1991) (per curiam) (sanctioning lawyer-led conspiracy to hide his partner's malpractice from
their client and to conceal the fact that the firm had committed possible malpractice, as well as
failure to advise the client to seek other legal counsel due to conflict of interest); Rosenberg v.
Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016, 1021 (Fla. 1982) ("The client must rely entirely on the good faith efforts of
the attorney in representing his interests. This reliance requires that the client have complete
confidence in the integrity and ability of the attorney and that absolute fairness and candor
characterize all dealings between them."); Fla. Bar v. Gaskin, 403 So. 2d 425, 426 (Fla. 1981) (per
curiam) ("Absolute candor to a client by a lawyer is mandated because the very foundation of an
effective attorney-client relationship is predicated upon mutual trust. Lawyers should never mislead
their clients.").
119. See McClure v. Thompson, 323 F.3d 1233, 1242 (9th Cir. 2003); In re Gonzalez, 773
A.2d 1026, 1029-31 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United States v. Falzone, 766 F. Supp. 1265, 1269-71
(W.D.N.Y. 1991); Dietz v. Meisenheimer & Herron, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 464, 475-76 (Ct. App. 2009);
Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348, 352-54 (Fla. 2002); Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. McGraw, 461
S.E.2d 850, 862 (W. Va. 1995).
120. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2012).
121. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60 (2000).
122. See Chrysler Corp. v. Carey, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1031-32 (E.D. Mo. 1998); Barnett Bank
of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Shirey, 655 So. 2d 1156, 1158-59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Shaw Res.
Ltd. v. Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell, P.C., 142 P.3d 560, 567 (Utah Ct. App. 2006); Bevan v. Fix, 42
P.3d 1013, 1029-30 (Wyo. 2002).
123. See Diversified Grp. v. Daugerdas, 139 F. Supp. 2d 445, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Carey,
5 F. Supp. 2d at 1032-33; Elkind v. Bennett, 958 So. 2d 1088, 1090-92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007);
USA Power, LLC v. PacificCorp, 235 P.3d 749, 763 (Utah 2010).
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by law. 124 The principle of confidentiality "applies not only to matters
communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information
relating to the representation, whatever its source."' 125 Ethical standards,
according to well-worn commentary, "require that lawyers not disclose any
information they receive from any source-not simply the client-if it is related
to the representation of the client."' 126 Even when certain documents may not
stand confidential, the precept of confidential communication applies to
safeguard all information, again from whatever source, relating to the
representation. 127 When practicing in a firm, a lawyer may confine
particular information to specified lawyers if expected or understood to
do so by the client.
128
At the same time, a lawyer may reveal confidential information "to
the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary ... to secure legal
advice about the lawyer's compliance with [the] Rules," or "to establish
a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the
lawyer and client," or "to respond to allegations in any proceeding
concerning the lawyer's representation of the client," or simply "to
comply with other law or a court order."' 129 Whether such disclosure is
mandated or permitted, the ABA supports not only "the growing
presence in law firms of in-house counsel," but also the broad
preservation of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine
recognized by state jurisdictions. 30 Indeed, the ABA publicaly "urges
124. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (2012) ("A lawyer should keep in confidence
information relating to representation of a client except so far as disclosure is required or permitted
by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.").
125. Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 3.
126. MORGAN, supra note 65, at 57.
127. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 3 (2012).
128. Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 5.
129. Id. R. 1.6(b). The Comments observe: "A lawyer's confidentiality obligations do not
preclude a lawyer from securing confidential legal advice about the lawyer's personal responsibility
to comply with these Rules." Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 9. Where a client's legal claim, a state disciplinary
charge, or other cause of action alleges "misconduct of the lawyer involving representation of the
client, the lawyer may respond to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to establish a
defense." Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 10. However, "the disclosure should be made in a manner that limits access
to the information to the tribunal or other persons having a need to know it and appropriate
protective orders or other arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent
practicable." Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 14.
130. Brief of Am. Bar Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at 1, 7, St. Simons Waterfront, LLC. v. Hunter,
Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 746 S.E.2d 98 (Ga. 2013) (No. S12G1924) [hereinafter Brief of Am.
Bar Ass'n]; see, e.g., St. Simons Waterfront, LLC. v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 746
S.E.2d 98, 102 (Ga. 2013) (holding that "the same basic analysis that is conducted to assess
privilege and work product in every other variation of the attorney-client relationship should also be
applied to the law firm in-house counsel situation"); RFF Family P'ship, L.P. v. Bums & Levinson,
LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1067-69 (Mass. 2013); see also Mark Curriden, Inside Story, A.B.A. J.,
May 2013, at 22, 23; Samson Habte, Georgia Recognizes Intrafirm Privilege for Internal Talks
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that the privilege and work product doctrine should be protected
unless there is compelling cause for a legal exception." 131 To the extent
that questions relating to the attorney-client privilege or work
product doctrine require factual development, according to the
ABA, such questions "should be decided by the trial court."'
' 32
Consider confidentiality questions in the following Illustration of the
undisclosed sharing of client information with a law firm's in-house
general counsel, malpractice insurance carrier, and outside professional
liability counsel in a malpractice disclosure dispute.
1. Illustration D
For Illustration D, consider the same facts as in Illustrations A, B,
and C, except that the law firm's healthcare team asks the client to
About Client's Concerns, 29 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA), 424, 456 (July 7, 2013);
Samson Habte, Law Firms Are Hopeful About Pending Rulings in Closely Watched 'Intrafirm
Privilege' Cases, 29 Law. Man. on Prof, Conduct (ABAIBNA), 7, 7-8 (June 5, 2013); Joan C.
Rogers, ABA Formally Backs Attorney-Client Privilege for Consults with Law Firms' Inside
Counsel, 29 Law. Manual on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA), 553,553 (Aug. 28 2013); Joan C. Rogers,
Massachusetts High Court Backs Privilege For Consults With Firm's In-House Counsel, 29 Law.
Manual on Prof. Conduct (ABAIBNA), 422, 422 (July 17, 2013); Martha Neil, Privilege Protects
In-House Law Firm Communications About Malpractice Claim from Client Discovery, A.B.A. J.
(July 11, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/law-firmcommunication_
about clientspossible malpractice claim is_.privileg.
Of note, RFF Family Partnership, L.P. v. Burns & Levinson, LLP found confidential
communications between law firm attorneys and firm in-house counsel concerning a malpractice
claim asserted by a current client of the firm to be protected from disclosure to the client by the
attorney-client privilege under four specific conditions:
(1) the law firm has designated an attorney or attorneys within the firm to represent the
firm as in-house counsel, (2) the in-house counsel has not performed any work on the
client matter at issue or a substantially related matter, (3) the time spent by the attorneys
in these communications with in-house counsel is not billed to a client, and (4) the
communications are made in confidence and kept confidential.
991 N.E.2d at 1067-69.
131. Brief of Am. Bar Ass'n, supra note 130, at 1 (announcing that "ABA policy does not
address the scope and effect of the privilege and work product doctrine when lawyers consult in-
house counsel regarding a client's actual or potential claims of malpractice").
132. Id. at 7. In its amicus brief, the ABA argues that the attorney-client "privilege should not
be abrogated or limited except for compelling reasons." Id. The ABA reasons that "the fiduciary
duty exception does not provide such a basis because it was not intended to apply to an in-house
counsel's communications with a firm lawyer where the in-house counsel has no fiduciary duty to
the outside client." Id. Further, the ABA explains, "a lawyer's consultation with the firm's in-house
counsel for the purposes of determining the lawyer's ethical obligations involves no inherent
conflict of interest and is encouraged under the Model Rules." Id. Still, the ABA cautions that:
[T]his analysis changes if it is concluded that the client may have a malpractice claim
against the lawyer: whether the privilege as to further in-house consultations is abrogated
or limited during a continuing representation might become a question of fact for the
trial court as to whether the client were promptly and adequately informed of the
potential claim.
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produce supplemental confidential information related to the
transactions under review in order to assess possible litigation or
alternative dispute resolution options. Without notice to or consent
of the client, the team transmits this information to the firm's in-
house general counsel,133 who then forwards the information to
the firm's malpractice insurance carrier and to its outside professional
liability counsel.
2. Confidentiality Disputes
Resolution of confidentiality disputes under Illustration D depends
on whether the law firm breached its fiduciary duty and violated the
Model Rules by disclosing the client's confidential information to
unauthorized third persons or by using that information to the
disadvantage of the client without its informed consent. This inquiry
gains complexity if the firm expressly agreed, and the client expressly
relied, that all representation-related information would be held inviolate
without regard to the nature or source of the information or the fact that
others shared that knowledge. 134 Here, even without such added
complexity, the client may contend that the firm's disclosure of
protected information to its in-house general counsel, malpractice
insurance carrier, and outside professional liability counsel knowingly
revealed the client's confidences to its disadvantage and to the
comparative advantage of the firm and its lawyers in anticipating and
mounting a defense to potential charges of malpractice.
In reply, the law firm may contend that it revealed the client's
confidential information to the extent reasonably necessary to establish a
defense on behalf of the firm, to respond to allegations concerning the
firm's representation of the client, and to secure legal advice about the
firm's compliance with relevant laws and ethics rules. This argument
presupposes that, at the time of the disclosure to the firm's in-house
general counsel, malpractice insurance carrier, and outside professional
liability counsel, either a disciplinary charge or a civil claim had been
formally instituted against the firm and its lawyers, or a specific
allegation by the client or third party disciplinary authorities had been
made concerning the firm's representation in the transactions at issue.
133. On the contrasting role of corporate in-house counsel, see Susan Hackett, Corporate
Counsel and the Evolution of Practical Ethical Navigation: An Overview of the Changing Dynamics
of Professional Responsibility in In-House Practice, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 317, 319 (2012).
134. To this point, the ABA observes: "Lawyers in a firm may, in the course of the firm's
practice, disclose to each other information relating to a client of the firm, unless the client has
instructed that particular information be confined to specified lawyers." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 5 (2012).
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Insofar as compliance-driven disclosure to the firm's in-house general
counsel, malpractice insurance carrier, and outside professional liability
counsel was permissible, the firm may do well to ensure that the
disclosure was made in a manner that limited access to the information
or instituted formal arrangements (for example, fire walls and screens),
minimizing the risk of open-ended disclosure. To the extent that
consultation with and disclosure to outside counsel for the purpose of
obtaining ethics advice about the firm's compliance duties may be initially
protected, 135 such consultation may run afoul of ethics rules if it becomes
materially adverse to the client or impermissibly exploits the confidences
for the firm's own benefit and to the disadvantage, and without the
informed consent, of the client. The same protection, the firm may claim,
extends to the notification of its malpractice insurance carrier, especially if
the information disclosed was limited, if the disclosure was authorized by the
client, or if the disclosure was of benefit to the client. Next, consider loyalty
and honest dealing.
E. Loyalty and Honest Dealing
The client-lawyer relationship engenders lawyer fiduciary duties of
loyalty and honest dealing.136 Both the ABA' 37 and the AL1'38 follow
these settled principles. Like communication and consultation, loyalty
and independent judgment "are essential elements in the lawyer's
relationship to a client."' 39  Read jointly, academic and practice
135. See id. R. 1.6(b)(4) (permitting revelation of information relating to client representation
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary "to secure legal advice about the lawyer's
compliance with [ethics rules]").
136. See Wald, Loyalty in Limbo, supra note 27, at 924-25; see also People ex rel. Dep't of
Corps. v. SpeeDee Oil Change Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 371, 378-79 (Cal. 1999); Fla. Bar v. Dunagan,
731 So. 2d 1237, 1242 (Fla. 1999) (per curiam); Fla. Bar v. Morse, 587 So. 2d 1120, 1120-21 (Fla.
1991) (per curiam); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Holland & Knight, 832 F. Supp. 1528, 1530-31 (S.D.
Fla. 1993); Duggan v. Gonsalves, 838 N.E.2d 614, 618-20 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (per curiam); In re
Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069, 1071 (N.Y. 1994); In re Tanella, 957 N.Y.S.2d 399, 406 (App. Div.
2013) (per curiam); Ulico Cas. Co. v. Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, 865 N.Y.S.2d
14, 20-21 (App. Div. 2008); Grosser-Samuels v. Jacquelin Designs Enters., 448 F. Supp. 2d 772,
779 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
137. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 & cmt. 2, 1.7 & cmt. 1, 8.4 (2012).
138. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF T1HE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 20, 121, 125 (2000)
(describing lawyer's duty to inform and consult with a client and conflicts of interest).
139. Morse v. Clark, 890 So. 2d 496, 498 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that "a lawyer
should act with undivided loyalty for his client and not place himself or herself in a position where a
conflicting interest may affect the obligations of an ongoing professional relationship"); MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 1 (2012); see also Blue Water Sunset, LLC v. Markowitz,
122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 641, 647 (Ct. App. 2011); Morrison Knudsen Corp. v. Hancock, Rothert &
Bunshofl, LLP, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 425, 429-30 (Ct. App. 1999); Country Club Partners, LLC v.
Goldman, 913 N.Y.S.2d 803, 805 (App. Div. 2010); Schlanger v. Flaton, 631 N.Y.S.2d 293, 296
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commentary in the field links the fiduciary duties of loyalty, honest
dealing, and communication, noting that an "important occasion for
communication with a client is advising the client that the lawyer has
acted (or failed to act) in a way that might expose the lawyer to
malpractice liability.' 140 In such circumstances, the lawyer labors under
a duty to provide such information.'
41
To ensure loyalty and honest dealing in transactional situations, as
illustrated here, the Model Rules regulate conflicts of interest regarding
the representation of adverse interests. 42  The Rules prohibit
representation of a client if there is a significant risk that the
representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by a
personal interest of the lawyer. 143 In malpractice disclosure-related
disputes, the personal or professional interest at play is the lawyer or law
firm's own self-defense. 144 By now it is axiomatic that "[a] conflict
(App. Div. 1995).
140. HAZARD ET AL., supra note 7, § 7.3 n.2; see also Lawyer's Interests Adverse to Client,
supra note 4, at 411-13 (noting the lawyer's obligation when his or her interest is adverse to the
client's interest).
141. HAZARD ET AL., supra note 7, § 7.3 n.2; see, e.g., Beal Bank, SSB v. Arter & Hadden,
LLP, 167 P.3d 666, 673 (Cal. 2007) ("[A]ttomeys have a fiduciary obligation to disclose material
facts to their clients, an obligation that includes disclosure of acts of malpractice."); Neel v.
Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 491 P.3d 421, 429 (Cal. 1971) (en banc) ("[T]he fact
that a client lacks awareness of a practitioner's malpractice implies, in many cases, a second breach
of duty by the fiduciary, namely, a failure to disclose material facts to his client."); see also In re
Gibson, 991 P.2d 277, 278-79 (Colo. 1999) (en banc) (per curiam) (ordering thirty day suspension
where attorney failed to inform his client that claim had been dismissed and instead created
fictitious settlement documents and disbursed funds to the client); Fla. Bar v. Bazley, 597 So. 2d
796, 796 (Fla. 1992) (per curiam) (ordering an eight-month suspension of attorney who failed to
inform his client that claim was barred by worker's compensation statute and instead falsely
represented that the claim was successful and advanced the client payments out of his own funds);
In re Mays, 495 S.E.2d 30, 30-31 (Ga. 1998) (per curiam) (finding disbarment appropriate where,
among other acts of misconduct, the attorney allowed statute of limitations to run but advised client
that case had been settled and paid her out of his own funds); Estate of Watkins v. Hedman,
Hileman & Lacosta, 91 P.3d 1264, 1265 (Mont. 2004) (tolling the three-year statute of limitations
for legal malpractice where the defendant-attorney had concealed her negligence). In RFF Family
Partnership, L.P. v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, the court remarked:
Although no reported Massachusetts case has squarely confronted the question of tort
liability for a lawyer's concealment of his own mistake, this hardly seems a stretch:
surely, a lawyer's discovery that he or his firm has mishandled a matter in a way that is
likely to damage the client's interests meets any reasonable definition of materiality, and
must be disclosed.
30 Mass. L. Rptr. 502, 505 (Super. Ct. 2012); see also Estate of Watkins, 91 P.3d at 1271; In re
Tallon, 447 N.Y.S.2d 50, 51 (App. Div. 1982) ("An attorney has a professional duty to promptly
notify his client of his failure to act and of the possible claim his client may thus have against
him."); Waggoner v. Caruso, No. 602192-2007, 2008 WL 4274491, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 10,
2008) ("Attorneys do have an obligation to disclose their own acts of malpractice to their clients.").
142. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2012).
143. Id. R. 1.7(a).
144. Lawyer's Interests Adverse to Client, supra note 4, at 411.
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between an attorney's self-interest and a client's interest is generally
presented whenever the lawyer's own conduct in the client's matter
is questioned."'' 45  That self-interest conflict, a hazard presented
here, "occurs most often when a lawyer is accused of unethical
conduct or malpractice in the client's matter.' 46  The majority
treatment of such conflicts among state jurisdictions is to "require the
lawyer's withdrawal.' 47
The Comments to the Model Rules underscore that a "lawyer's own
interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on
representation of a client."' 148 The logic behind this prohibition is
straightforward: "[I]f the probity of a lawyer's own conduct in a
transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for
the lawyer to give a client detached advice."'149 The Comments reason
that "a conflict of interest exists if there is a significant risk that a
lawyer's ability to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate
course of action for the client will be materially limited as a result of the
lawyer's other responsibilities or interests."' 15 Critical to conflicts of
interest analysis is a risk assessment tied to "the likelihood that a
difference in interests will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will
materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment
in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably
should be pursued on behalf of the client."''
Despite the existence of a conflict of interest, a law firm may
permissibly represent a client given the reasonable belief that it will be
able to provide competent and diligent representation and given the
informed consent of the client, 112 confirmed in writing. 153 Significantly,
145. Id. at 411-12 (noting "the difficulty in such circumstances of giving detached advice").
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 10 (2012); see also Petrovic v. Amoco
Oil Co., 200 F.3d 1140, 1155 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting that family ties and personal relationships can
create a material limitation conflict).
149. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 10 (2012).
150. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 8.
151. Id.
152. Under the Model Rules, the "informed consent" of a client "denotes the agreement by a
person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information
and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed
course of conduct." Id. R. 1.0(e). The Comments add: "The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to
ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an
informed decision." Id. R. 1.0 cmt. 6. At a minimum:
[T]his will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and
circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to
inform the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the
proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client's or other person's options and
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the Comments mention that, "some conflicts are nonconsentable,
meaning that the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such
agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's consent,"
indeed, such "representation is prohibited if in the circumstances the
lawyer cannot reasonably conclude that the lawyer will be able to
provide competent and diligent representation."' 154 Accordingly, there
may be litigation or transactional circumstances where it may prove
impossible for a firm to make the disclosure necessary to obtain full and
informed client consent. 155 Unsurprisingly, when a law firm declines to
make the full disclosure necessary to permit a client to reach an
informed decision on whether or not to continue its retention, the firm
may be unable to ask the client to consent to continued representation or
to consent to a release from malpractice liability.156 In such event, the
firm is likely to have breached its fiduciary obligations and violated its
ethical duties by declining to withdraw.'57 Consider loyalty and honest
alternatives.
Id. Where necessary, "it may be appropriate for a lawyer to advise a client or other person to seek
the advice of other counsel." Id. A lawyer, to be sure, "need not inform a client or other person of
facts or implications already known to the client or other person." Id.
153. See id. R. 1.7 cmt. 20, mentioning that:
The requirement of a writing does not supplant the need in most cases for the lawyer to
talk with the client, to explain the risks and advantages, if any, of representation
burdened with a conflict of interest, as well as reasonably available alternatives, and to
afford the client a reasonable opportunity to consider the risks and alternatives and to
raise questions and concerns.
Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 20.
154. Id. R. 1.7 cmts. 14-15 ("When the lawyer is representing more than one client, the
question of consentability must be resolved as to each client.").
155. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 14.
156. As illustrated here, concurrent client and institutional representation in the context of
lawyer or law firm self-defense oftentimes presents a materially adverse, nonconsentable conflict in
breach of the duties of loyalty and honest fair dealing whether or not the client knows of such a
conflict. See Lawyer's Interests Adverse to Client, supra note 4, at 411 (noting "the difficulty in
such circumstances of giving detached advice"); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7
cmt. 1 (2012).
157. The client-lawyer relationship spawns lawyer fiduciary duties of withdrawal and client
protection. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-450 (2008) ("If the
continued representation of any client would cause the lawyer to violate a Rule, including
participation in any fraud, withdrawal from that representation will be required."). Both the ABA
and the ALI back this vital principle of client protection. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.16 (2012); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 cmt. e (2000).
The Model Rules specifically address the termination of lawyer representation. MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2012). Under the Model Rules, where representation has commenced, a
lawyer must withdraw if the representation itself will result in violation of the Model Rules or other
law. Id. R. 1.16(a). The Comments add: "A lawyer should not accept representation in a matter
unless it can be performed competently, promptly, without improper conflict of interest, and to
completion." Id. R. 1.16 cmt. 1. Moreover, under the Rules, "a lawyer may withdraw from
representing a client if... withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the
interests of the client . . . or ... other good cause for withdrawal exists." Id. R. 1.16(b)(1).
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dealing in the following illustration of a law firm's internal investigation
of client-lawyer conflicts of interest and its decision to withdraw from
the underlying representation in a malpractice disclosure dispute.
1. Illustration E
For Illustration E, consider the same facts as in Illustrations A, B,
C, and D, except that the law firm's corporate and intellectual property
groups and in-house general counsel record billable time... and create
numerous documents 5 9 in consultation with its malpractice insurance
carrier and outside professional liability counsel in an internal
investigative effort to determine whether it may continue
representation of the client in unrelated litigation and transactional
matters. 160 After initially soliciting and obtaining the client's consent to
such continuing representation without disclosure of its conflict of
interest and malpractice concerns, the firm reverses course and issues
withdrawal and termination of representation notices to the client.
2. Loyalty and Honest Dealing Disputes
Resolution of loyalty and honest dealing disputes under Illustration
E turns on whether the law firm breached its fiduciary duties by placing
the firm and its lawyers in a position where their conflicting individual
and institutional self-defense interests materially impaired their
professional obligations to the client. On this inquiry, the firm's
responsibility to safeguard its own institutional self-interest likely
creates a substantial risk that the representation of the client's corporate
and intellectual property interests might be materially impaired or
limited. 16 1 Here, the client may contend that the firm's loyalty was
Additional client protection provisions address malpractice liability waiver and settlement. See id.
R. 1.8(h) (2012).
158. For a discussion of modem billing practices, see Douglas R. Richmond, For a Few
Dollars More: The Perplexing Problem of Unethical Billings Practices by Lawyers, 60 S.C. L. REV.
63, 71-72, 81 (2008); Douglas R. Richmond, The New Law Firm Economy, Billable Hours, and
Professional Responsibility, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 207, 221-22 (2000); see also Deborah Rhode,
Profits and Professionalism, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 49, 49-50 (2005).
159. On law firm in-house privilege, see William T. Barker, Law Firm In-House Attorney-
Client Privilege Vis-b-Vis Current Clients, 70 DEF. COUNS. J. 467, 469-70 (2003); Elizabeth
Chambliss, The Scope of In-Firm Privilege, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1721, 1753-54 (2005); Peter
R. Jarvis & Mark J. Fucile, Inside an In-House Legal Ethics Practice, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL'Y 103,111-12 (2000).
160. For a discussion of law firm internal investigations, see Brendan F. Quigley, The Need to
Know: Law Firm Internal Investigations and the Intra-Firm Dissemination of Privileged
Communications, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 889, 891-96 (2007); Douglas R. Richmond, Law Firm
Internal Investigations: Principles and Perils, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 69, 77-82 (2004).
161. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-453 (2008) ("[W]hen
the principal purpose of the [in-house ethics counsel] consultation is to protect the interests of the
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impaired because it could no longer consider, recommend, or carry out
an appropriate litigation or transactional course of action as a result of its
own self-defense interests. Along this line, the client may observe that it
is highly doubtful that the firm could reasonably hold an objective,
disinterested belief in its own professional effectiveness given its
allegedly negligent transactional performance and its self-defense
interests in withholding information of its negligence, or even make the
disclosure necessary to obtain proper consent from the client. 1
62
From the client's standpoint, when the financial interests of the law
firm might be affected by the representation, full and informed client
consent requires disclosure of anything bearing on the representation
that might affect the client's continuing litigation or transactional
interests.163 Only by having disclosed all relevant considerations to the
transactions, so the argument goes, could the firm safeguard the client's
opportunity to be the judge of its own interests. 164 Adequate disclosure
in this situation, the client may add, required information specific to the
firm's adverse interests and positions sufficient to enable the client to
make a fully informed decision whether to continue with the
representation. 61 Where the firm's self-interest may have precluded
making full disclosure, the client may assert that the circumstances
demanded withdrawal and precluded undertaking further representation
in ongoing entity transactions or in related litigation precisely because
the firm knew or reasonably should have known that the representation
could not be performed competently, without improper conflict of
interest, and to completion.
In response, the firm may cast the instant conflict in potential, rather
than disqualifying, terms, allowing it to contend that it fully complied with
the fiduciary duties of loyalty and honest dealing. 66 The firm may point to
the absence of a conflict of interest during the underlying Hatch-Waxman
due diligence investigation and the consequent negotiation of the
consulting lawyer or the firm (typically for action already taken), the risk that the consulting
lawyer's representation of the firm's client will be materially limited may be significant.").
162. See id.
163. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 10 (2012).
164. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-453 (2008).
165. Id. ("In the absence of the client's informed consent confirmed in writing, a lawyer may
not represent the client if there is a significant risk that the representation will be materially limited
by a conflicting interest of the lawyer." (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2)
(2012))).
166. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4, 1.7 (2012); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 20, 121, 125 (2000) (describing lawyers' duty to inform and
consult with a client and conflicts of interest); HAZARD ET AL., supra note 7, § 7.3 n. 2; Lawyer's
Interests Adverse to Client, supra note 4, at 411-13.
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167underlying transactions. Implicit in that contention is the suggestion that a
conflict will not ripen into a disqualifying controversy when a firm believes
that a malpractice problem may be resolved in a manner that does not put
the interests of the client and the firm in significant conflict. The firm may
also contend that it was appropriate to represent the client at the same time that
the firm's corporate and intellectual property groups were consulting with in-
house general counsel, the malpractice insurance carrier, and outside
professional liability counsel because of the absence of evidence that the
firm's internal investigation in any way prejudiced the client. Lacking a
finding of prejudice, this contention may mitigate a conflict of interest
risk resulting from the firm's internal consultations among its lawyers, in-
house general counsel, the malpractice insurance carrier, and outside
professional liability counsel, while continuing to represent the client,
because the actions of the firm were at all times consistent with the interests of
the client.
Having surveyed the standard progression of malpractice disclosure
disputes from the formation of the client-lawyer relationship to the
lawyer's commission and the law firm's discovery of a harmful
performance error;.6 then to the law firm's delay and omission in
communicating information of the error to the client; 169 next to the
undisclosed sharing of client information with the law firm's in-house
general counsel, malpractice insurance carrier, and outside professional
liability counsel; 170 and finally to the law firm's internal investigation of
client-lawyer conflicts of interest and the ultimate decision to withdraw
from the representation,' 7' consider the content of contemporary best
practice guidelines for malpractice disclosure disputes in the field of
lawyer and law firm regulation. 1
72
III. BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES
This Part considers the formulation of best practice guidelines
applicable to law firm malpractice disclosure disputes of the kind
illustrated here. 173 In assessing law firm-wide incidents of malpractice
and misconduct, commentators increasingly urge that "discipline be
imposed on law firms, not exclusively individual lawyers," arguing that
"focus should be on creating a regulatory regime-that gives law firms a
167. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmts. 3. 5 (2012).
168. See supra Part IA-B.
169. See supra Part B.C.
170. See supra Part iID.
171. See supra Part ILE.
172. See infra Part lI
173. See infra notes 174-212 and accompanying text,
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stake in producing quality work and building their reputations."' 7 4 They
stress that "the Model Rules impose personal duties on law firm
managers to establish rules designed to help assure that individual firm
lawyers and non-lawyers adhere to the standards of lawyer conduct.
175
Calling for "sanctioning practice organizations, not just individual
lawyers," they reason that, "while we should continue to require
lawyers individually to adhere to standards of integrity and
confidentiality, conduct standards also should be imposed on practice
organizations themselves.' 76
To ensure the discharge of these obligations, many recommend
institutional risk management programs and systems, firm- or practice-
wide policies and procedures, and leadership structures .designed to
minimize liability risk to the firm and its lawyers. 177 Bolstered by the
lawyers' professional liability insurance industry, these
recommendations lay the groundwork for national best practice
guidelines in malpractice disclosure disputes. 78 Resting on a primarily
instrumental, rather than an aspirational or a normative foundation, the
guidelines reflect the liability insurance mandates of loss prevention and
risk management. That groundwork acknowledges law firm economic self-
interest, yet echoes the widespread concern that "the financial pressures in
the practice of law today," particularly the "premium on bringing in the
hours, and bringing in the clients," pose "the very real risk of losing a
sense that lawyers are trustees of a tradition"'179 embedded in notions of
civic and republican citizenship. 180  Those financial pressures and
174. Thomas D. Morgan, On the Declining Importance of Legal Institutions, 2012 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 255, 278; see also Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, A New Framework for Law
Firm Discipline, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 335, 338 (2003); Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline
for Law Firms?, 77 CORNqELL L. REV. 1, 14 (1991); Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline in 2050:
A Look Back, 60 FORDHAm~ L. REV. 125, 129 (1991); cf Coquina Invs. v. Rothstein, No.
10-60786-Civ, 2012 WL 3202273, at *11 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2012) (declining, via omnibus order, to
issue law firm-wide sanction on finding that misconduct was disaggregated among individual
lawyers and litigation teams).
175. Thomas D. Morgan, The Rise ofInstitutional Law Practice, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1005,
1007 (2012).
176. Id. at 1012-13 (noting that New York and New Jersey have adopted forms of this
proposal).
177. Id. at 1016.
178. On the need for systemic guidelines, see Jennifer Knauth, Legal Malpractice: When the
Legal System Turns on the Lawyer, 35 ST. MARY'S L.J. 963, 970-73 (2004); Manuel R. Ramos,
Legal Malpractice: The Profession's Dirty Little Secret, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1657, 1732-33 (1994);
see generally Robert E. O'Malley et al., Preventing Legal Malpractice in Large Law Firms, C641
ALI-ABA 133 (1991).
179. Thomas D. Morgan, The Fall and Rise of Professionalism, 19 U. RICH. L. REV. 451, 460
(1985).
180. See Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America's Governing Class: The Formation and
Dissolution of the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer's Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH.
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attendant professional strains embolden the risk-taking conduct of law
firm malpractice non-disclosure seen in the commonly reported failure
to communicate negligent performance promptly, to explain the
consequences of that negligence fully, to withdraw from
nonconsentable conflicts of interest regarding continued
representation of a client's best interests, to mitigate or remedy the
adverse consequences of negligent conduct, and to protect a client's
interests in confidentiality and independent representation. For law firms,
this cascade of errors may signal a systemic failure of supervision, a
failure which may result in malpractice reporting disputes, whether or
not a client appeared sophisticated, benefited from in-house or successor
counsel, or suffered prejudice. 181
Predicated on the loss prevention duty to report errors and
potential malpractice claims to represented clients, uniform industry-
wide compliance guidelines address particular types of errors requiring
client reporting, the timing of the reporting, the informational
content of the reporting (that is, the nature of the error only or the
error plus reference to a potential malpractice action), and the post-
disclosure conflicts of interest likely to limit continued
representation of the affected client. 182 In this way, the risk
management guidelines comport with the core belief in the lawyer's
professional obligation "to make the interests of the client paramount,
even at some personal risk, loss or inconvenience to himself."'183 Both
academics and practitioners searching for prescriptive individual and
institutional remedies for malpractice disputes recognize situations in
which a lawyer's own interests may very well conflict with a client's
interests. Because the interests of the client deserve primacy under
ROUNDTABLE 381, 410-12 (2001); Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the
Legal Ethics Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 276-77 (1992).
181. Systemic institutional failure may carry grave consequences for law firms. See, e.g.,
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 cmt. 1 (2012) (discussing misconduct); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 53 cmt. h (2000) (discussing intentional or reckless
misconduct). Under subdivision (c) of Model Rule 8.4, it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to
"engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2012). The Comments add that a lawyer "should be professionally
answerable" for offenses involving "dishonesty" or "breach of trust." Id. R. 8.4 cmt. 2. In addition
to economic damages for such offenses, applicable remedies may include the disgorgement of fees
paid to the law firm. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 37 (2000).
182. See CNA, supra note 21; see also Douglas R. Richmond, The Duty to Report Professional
Misconduct: A Practical Analysis of Lawyer Self-Regulation, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 175, 199-
200 (1999); see generally Charles E. Lundberg, Self-Reporting Malpractice or Ethics Problems,
BENCH & B. MINN., Sept. 2003, at 24; Timothy J. Pierce & Sally E. Anderson, What to Do After
Making a Serious Error, WIs. LAW., Feb. 2010, at 6.
183. Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 702, 705 (1977).
[Vol. 42:17
LAW FIRM MALPRACTICE DISCLOSURE
conventional views of the lawyering process, for many, "[a] lawyer's
professional judgment and advice to a client should reflect the empathy,
respect, and practical wisdom that the lawyer would offer a good
friend." 184  Although distinct from standard risk management
calibrations, the long-held aspirational view of the lawyer-as-
friend strives to rejuvenate the role of the lawyer as counselor and to
refashion the client-lawyer relationship "as an intrinsically valuable
personal relation."'
185
Building on these fiduciary norms and professional traditions,
legal services industry best practice guidelines for malpractice
disclosure embrace an objective standard of the disinterested lawyer
in classifying the types of errors that may warrant reporting. 186 Applied
here, the standard operates to determine the possible breach of a
lawyer's fiduciary duties of care, competence, and diligence due to a
lack of legal knowledge, investigative care and effort, or skill,
thoroughness, and preparation. 187 Of necessity, this determination entails
an analysis of the factual and legal elements of the underlying litigation
or transaction at issue. 188 The same standard helps to determine
whether the error "would likely result in prejudice to a client's
rights or claims."'189 If so, the best practice guidelines tilt toward
candid, open reporting to the client.' 90 To an important extent, the
duty to report "depends on facts and circumstances known to the
lawyer at the time the error is discovered," rather than on any error-
infected facts and circumstances "revealed as part of a subsequent
investigation or recognized in hindsight."' 191 To be sure, this "case-
by-case" approach poses familiar analytic and regulatory
difficulties. 192  Yet, according to the recommended liability
guidelines, "a lawyer should be given an opportunity to correct the
error or omission before having to disclose the error to the
client."' 193 In this respect, the guidelines prudently contemplate the
184. Id.; Thomas D. Morgan, Thinking About Lawyers as Counselors, 42 FLA. L. REv. 439,
445 (1990).
185. Compare WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS'
ETHICS 19 (1998), with Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the
Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1071 (1976).
186. See CNA, supra note 21, at2.





192. Colo. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 113 (2005), available at
http://www.cobar.org/repository/Ethics/FormalEthicsOpion/FormalEthicsOpinionl 13_2011 .pdf.
193. CNA,supra note 21, at4.
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need both to communicate with a firm's in-house counsel
194 and "to
consult with outside counsel to receive a disinterested attorney's
opinion before deciding whether or not to disclose the
information.' ' 195 For the ABA, "consultation with a law firm's in-
house counsel about a lawyer's ethical obligations in connection with
a current representation involves no inherent conflict of interest."' 196
On the timing of the reporting, the insurance industry guidelines
urge the lawyer to "report the error to the client 'promptly. 1,,197
Prompt reporting envisions disclosure "as soon as the attorney
knows of the error and has determined that the error cannot be
rectified."' 198 This directive is consonant with the duties of candor,
communication, and consultation, and the corresponding obligations of
full and fair material disclosure. These fairness duties and performance
obligations reinforce the import of independent professional judgment
and straightforward advice in rendering an honest assessment of lawyer
and law firm error, informing the client of the substantive impact of that
error, and explaining matters adequately enough to enable the client to
grant informed consent to the representation on a current or a continuing
basis. By definition, the responsibilities of reasonable communication,
informed decision making, truthfulness, and best interest
representation seem irreconcilable with the asserted rights to withhold
information to serve the lawyer's own interest and convenience or, more
troubling, to misrepresent information by making partially true but
misleading statements or omissions that fall equivalent to affirmative
false statements.
Across state jurisdictions, similar rules of practice rising out
of efforts to mediate such rights-duties clashes sometimes concede
the lawyer-based requirement "to disclose material facts about the
representation as well as the significance of those facts," yet nonetheless
maintain that the lawyer "is not required to advise the client that the
client has a malpractice claim against [him]. ' 99 This competing rule set
194. Brief of Am. Bar Ass'n, supra note 130, at 14-15 (remarking that "whether
communications with a firm's in-house counsel should be protected by the privilege may depend on
factual determinations, e.g., as to the role played by the in-house counsel and not ... on the
fiduciary duty exception or other implication of conflict theory").
195. CNA,supra note 21, at4.
196. Brief of Am. Bar Ass'n, supra note 130, at 18, 20 ("[O]btaining legal advice from other
lawyers within the law firm does not automatically create a conflict with the representation of the
existing client."); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-453 (2008).
197, CNA, supra note 21, at4 ("The client needs to be reasonably informed about the status of
the matter in order to make informed decisions regarding the representation.").
198, Id.
199. Thomas P. McGarry & Thomas P. Sukowicz, Ethics: Disclosing Malpractice to Clients,
CHI. LAW. (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.chicagolawyermagazine.com/Archives/ 2 011/12/McGarry-
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distinguishes supplying "material facts and their legal significance" to a
client from "inform[ing] the client of the legal conclusion" of
malpractice. 20° Thus cabined, the narrowed duty to disclose evidence of
malpractice or a potential claim of malpractice surfaces "only when
there is an ongoing, attorney-client relationship and the actual or
potential malpractice claim could interfere with the lawyer's exercise of
judgment on behalf of the client., 20 1 On this alternative valence, limiting
the duty of malpractice disclosure to conflict of interest situations arising
out of continued representation renders certain disclosure statements
improper, not only because the lawyer, rather than an independent
counsel, would be giving legal advice to the client about a potential
malpractice claim against himself, but also because such statements
would constitute "an admission against interest that could be used
against the lawyer in the malpractice litigation" itself.20 2 This truncated
duty derives from the general insurance industry rule that "lawyers who
have malpractice insurance have a duty under their policies to cooperate
in the defense of any malpractice claim. 20 3 Under the force of that rule,
"unnecessary admissions of liability" pronounced in statements of
disclosure or warning "could be considered a violation of the duty of
cooperation and could affect coverage.,
204
In contrast, on the informational content of the reporting contemplated
here, the instant best practice guidelines adopt the majority state view,
joined by Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, and Wisconsin,
announcing the lawyer's "ethical obligation to promptly notify the
client of both the failure to act and of the possible malpractice
claim against the attorney., 20 5 Notification of this kind effectively
informs the client of the "facts surrounding the error" and
furnishes "the client an opportunity to seek out the advice of
independent counsel as to whether or not malpractice occurred.,
20 6
Information concerning the responsibilities of law firm partners,
managers, and supervisory lawyers and their efforts to ensure that the
firm properly conformed to the commands of applicable ethics rules,
especially internal policies and procedures designed to detect and







205. CNA, supra note 21, at 4.
206. Id. at 4-5. The guidelines recommend that "an attempt should be made to initially disclose
the error in a face-to-face meeting." Id. at 5.
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less experienced lawyers, may prove useful to this process of
reporting.20 7 Likewise, lawyer-ratifying instructions or orders issued at a
time when the adverse consequences of the challenged conduct may
have been avoided or mitigated, and any intervening lawyer efforts to
take reasonable remedial action on behalf of the client, may prove
equally helpful to the reporting process. The duty of confidentiality,
though safeguarding all information relating to the representation, is
unlikely to bar such disclosure in as much as the information at
stake pertains to law firm self-governing internal compliance efforts,
rather than firm self-regarding external efforts to secure legal advice
about ethical compliance, to establish a defense, or to respond to
208disciplinary allegations.
On post-disclosure conflicts of interest and continued
representation of the affected client, the industry guidelines wisely
recognize the "strong possibility that a conflict has developed because
the attorney and client will soon be direct adversaries," rendering
it "difficult for the attorney to render impartial advice.,
20 9
Consequently, as a best practice, malpractice conflict analysis
concentrates on risk assessment-"the greater the risk that the
lawyer will face a substantial malpractice claim due to the error, the
greater the likelihood the attorney's personal interest and ability to
provide impartial advice will become compromised and the
representation of that client will be materially limited., 210 In the
same way, risk assessment is pivotal to the operation and
enforcement of the fiduciary duties of loyalty and honest dealing in the
lawyer's relationship to a client. Together with communication
obligations, loyalty and honest dealing norms compel client disclosure
that the lawyer has acted (or failed to act) in a way that may expose him
to malpractice liability. The presence of such malpractice liability
exposure carries a significant risk that the representation of one or more
clients will be materially limited by the personal interest of the lawyer in
his own self-defense.
Likewise, the Model Rules acknowledge the risk of an individual or
institutional self-interest conflict when a lawyer or law firm is accused
of unethical conduct or malpractice in the client's underlying matter.21'
207. On the risks and rewards of intra-firm communication, see Jeremy A. Gogel, Intra-Firm
Communications About Potential Legal Malpractice Claims: An Exception to Attorney-Client
Privilege, FOR DEF., Apr. 2012, at 66, 66-67, 72; Brian Pollack, Surviving a Screwup, LITIG., Winter
2008, at 19, 25.
208. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2012).
209. CNA,supra note 21, at5.
210. Id. at6.
211. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-453 (2008) (observing
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By express purpose, the Rules seek to regulate the adverse effect of
lawyer self-interest conflicts on the representation of a client.212
Regulation focuses on the probity of a lawyer's own conduct, constraints
on his ability to give a client detached advice, and limitations on his
ability to consider, recommend, or carry out an appropriate course of
action for the client. Risk regulation of this sort attempts to assess the
likelihood that a difference in client-lawyer interests will eventuate and,
if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's
independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or
foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued in
advancing the client's best interests. When conflicts stand
nonconsentable, that is, when the lawyer involved cannot properly seek
client agreement to the representation or provide representation on the
basis of the client's consent, such assessments will inexorably result in
the conclusion that continued representation is prohibited because it is
impossible to make the disclosure necessary to obtain full and informed
client consent, and also because it is impossible to provide competent
and diligent representation.
Viewed against the background of aspirational standards and
professional traditions regulating lawyer conduct in malpractice
disclosure disputes, the best practice guidelines, deduced here from
insurance industry standards, state ethics opinions, and common law
fiduciary principles, establish instructive baseline norms for reporting
law firm error, for timing and framing the content of that reporting,
and for evaluating the impact of post-disclosure conflicts of
interest on the client-lawyer relationship and the quality of
lawyer representation in both litigation and transactional cases.
As applied here, these insurance liability norms serve
more instrumental purposes tailored toward loss prevention and
risk management imperatives, rather than overarching ethical or
moral considerations.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article addresses the interwoven problems of law firm error
and client malpractice disclosure.2t 3 Although frequently overshadowed
by larger debates pertaining to the ethical culture and infrastructure of
that "a personal interest conflict will arise if the principal goal of the ethics consultation is to protect
the interest of the consulting lawyer or law firm from the consequences of a firm lawyer's
misconduct").
212. Id.
213. See supra Part 11.
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law firms, the ongoing problem of error disclosure, or, more frequently,
non-disclosure, and its varied methods of resolution, capture important
considerations of law firm culture and infrastructure, ethical regulation,
professional liability, and risk management policy and procedure. In an
effort to unpack the problem of law firm error disclosure, this Article
narrows the inquiry to law firms' acts of delay in communicating
information to clients and acts of declination in withholding information
214
from clients. Two questions come out of this abridged inquiry and still
remain open to debate. When may a law firm permissibly delay the
disclosure of information to a client about individual lawyer or firm-
wide incidents of malpractice? And, when may a law firm permissibly
withhold information from a client about such incidents and their
consequences to the client? Both questions implicate the field of lawyer
regulation and law firm ethical culture, the general law governing lawyer
and law firm malpractice, and evolving best practice industry guidelines
of disclosure. 2 5  Both also pose fundamental challenges to
the aspirational traditions of the profession and the highest standards of
law practice.
214. See supra Part II.
215. See supra Part III.
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